- Pritzker Fellows
- Current Fellows
- Morgan McSweeney
Morgan McSweeney
Former Strategist for the British Labour Party
Biography
Morgan McSweeney is a political strategist and former Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He has worked at the centre of British politics for more than a decade, including as Campaign Director of the Labour Party during its successful 2024 general election campaign, Chief of Staff to the Leader of the Opposition, Chief Executive of Labour Together, and Campaign Director of Keir Starmer’s leadership campaign.
His work has focused on political strategy, party renewal, democratic leadership, campaign organisation and the relationship between government, trust and public consent.
Seminars
“The World as It Is, Not as You May Wish It to Be: Power, Democracy & Leadership in a Harder Age”
For a generation, many democracies lived with a comforting assumption: history was broadly moving towards greater openness, stability, prosperity and freedom. That assumption no longer holds. War has returned to Europe. Technology is moving faster than institutions can govern it. Globally, trust is lower, populism is stronger, and the information environment is fragmented. The state is being asked to do more at the very moment when many citizens doubt whether it can still deliver.
Morgan McSweeney, a former political strategist for the British Labour Party who masterminded Labour's 2024 general election landslide, will share his insights into politics in the world as it is, not as many imagined it would be. Drawing on experience from campaigns, party leadership and government in the United Kingdom and Canada, McSweeney will help us examine how democratic politics actually works under pressure: how leaders make decisions, how parties change, how internal and external opposition shape what is possible, how technology alters persuasion, how governments struggle to move at speed, and how democracies can renew themselves without pretending the old world is coming back.
Our case study, the United Kingdom, contains many of the pressures now visible across Europe and the United States: economic insecurity, mistrust of institutions, the rise of populist politics, arguments over national identity, pressure on public services, declining faith in traditional parties, and a continuing argument about its place in the world. Britain is not exceptional, but it is revealing. For American students, it offers both a mirror and a warning. Can old democracies renew themselves in time, or do they only recognise the need for renewal after a crisis has already arrived?
Democracy won’t renew itself. It’ll need people who understand the world as it is, who are prepared to act inside imperfect institutions, who can hold together moral seriousness and practical judgement, and who don’t treat the future as something that simply happens to them. How do we build, persuade, govern, organise, oppose, lead, and take responsibility when democratic politics is under strain, and what are the battle scars we endure along the way?
Seminars are off the record and open to current UChicago students only.
This isn’t a normal political moment. But you are not late to history. You are early to the future. For most of the modern era, many people grew up with the assumption that the world was basically moving towards more stability, more openness, more prosperity, more democracy and more progress. That assumption no longer holds in the same way in a world reshaped by war, technology, economic insecurity, migration, climate pressure, authoritarian power, and a deep loss of trust in institutions.
Across many countries, younger generations are being forced to ask whether they will inherit decline or help build something different. Younger people are stepping into a political order already under strain. The point isn’t to romanticise crisis; it’s to recognise that history has arrived earlier than many expected.
Let’s unpack what’s changed; why so many of the old assumptions failed; why democratic politics now feels more consequential, more volatile, and more morally demanding than it did even a decade ago; and how we may well be in the beginning of a new era in which citizens, leaders, governments, and institutions rediscover what they are for. Do you intend to watch that future being made or play some part in making it?
One of the great mistakes of modern politics is to treat voters as problems to be solved, data to be analysed, or frustrations to be messaged around. Democratic anger is too often attributed to misinformation, bad leaders, or social media. Those things matter, but they aren’t the whole story.
Often, anger begins much closer to home. It begins when people work hard and still feel insecure; when a decent home feels out of reach; when a high street declines and nobody seems able to stop it; when children may not do better than their parents; when public services feel slow, distant or indifferent; when people feel that the country is changing around them, but the people in charge do not really understand their lives. That is when politics starts to change.
People don’t only want to be managed better. They want dignity. They want recognition. They want control. They want someone to say, truthfully, that what they are experiencing is real and that politics is capable of doing something about it. What happens when people stop believing that effort leads somewhere?
Campaigns taught McSweeney what it means to listen properly without indulging every grievance and what democratic politics must do if it wants to earn faith back. Politics has to offer a more truthful account of dignity, control, and change.
Ideas matter in politics, but ideas don’t implement themselves. Let’s get practical on building democratic power: parties, campaigns, coalitions, discipline, organisation, message, leadership, and timing. Modern politics often rewards commentary about power more than the hard work of building it. But democratic change requires institutions, coalitions, and majorities. It requires people who can persuade across differences, hold together groups that don’t naturally agree, and keep moving under pressure from opponents, allies, media, activists, donors, members, unions, candidates, officials, and events.
In democratic politics, the most difficult resistance doesn’t always come from your formal opponents. It can come from within your own coalition, your own party, your own institutions, or your own side’s inability to accept what victory requires.
This session will draw directly on practical experience from campaigns and party leadership in the UK. How do you change a party without breaking it? How do you build a coalition broad enough to win but coherent enough to govern? How do you handle internal opposition without becoming consumed by it? How do you distinguish between conflict that can be postponed and conflict that cannot? How do you move at speed without losing judgement? The question is what kind of power is being built, for what purpose, and with what discipline.
Leadership looks very different when trust is low. In easier times, people may give leaders the benefit of the doubt. They may assume institutions are basically competent. They may accept that decisions take time. They may believe that, even if things are difficult now, the system is broadly moving in the right direction.
In a harder age, none of that can be assumed. People want to know that leaders see the country as it really is. They want recognition before they’ll accept instruction. They want to feel that the person asking them to be patient has some understanding of the pressure they are under. But recognition is only the beginning; leadership also requires authority and the ability to choose, making trade-offs and disappointing people, It also requires delivery, because in an age of low trust, credibility is not granted by office. It has to be earned again and again.
We’ll look at case studies of decision-making under pressure, exploring the difference between being reasonable and being passive, between consultation and drift, between patience and evasion, and discern campaigns that found the mood of a country, governments that lost control of events, leaders who spoke to people’s lives, and leaders who sounded plausible but could not make anything happen.
Politics has always involved persuasion. That’s not new. What is new is the scale, speed, and intimacy of the tools now available to persuade people. AI, data, platforms, personalised media and synthetic content are beginning to change not just how campaigns communicate, but how people experience reality itself. The old world hasn’t disappeared, but it’s being joined by something more fragmented and more powerful: personalised political realities, emotional targeting, simulated authenticity, deepfakes, algorithmic outrage, influencer ecosystems, automated content production, rapid message testing, and campaigns that can adapt at extraordinary speed.
That creates new opportunities; it also creates serious moral choices. The people who understand these tools will have power. The question is what kind of power they think they are exercising. Is it persuasion or manipulation? Is it mobilisation or addiction? Is it helping people see more clearly or trapping them more deeply inside what they already fear and resent? Anyone serious about politics now needs to understand how technology is changing campaigning, organising, fundraising, media, polling, voter contact, and narrative formation.
The future of democracy will depend not only on whether the new tools work, but also on whether people with power know where to draw the line and how hostile states and anti-democratic actors can weaponise the same technologies: narrative seeding, synthetic content, deepfakes, false civic groups, manipulated polling, financial engineering, legal disruption, and attacks designed less to persuade citizens of one falsehood than to make them doubt whether truth can be known at all.
Competence isn’t a dry or technocratic subject. It’s a moral question. When government fails, the consequences aren’t evenly shared. People with money can often escape failure. They can go private, move area, buy help, and work around the system. People without money usually cannot—they have to live inside the failure. If democracy is to mean anything practical, the state has to be able to act. It has to be able to decide, build, deliver, correct mistakes, and make visible improvements in people’s lives.
McSweeney will offer candid insights from his time in government into what governing actually feels like from the inside: why systems drift, why decisions slow down, why accountability fragments, why the urgent often defeats the important, and why reforming the state is now central to democratic renewal. A government that cannot deliver will eventually drain belief from the very causes it claims to serve.
Not everyone in this room will go into politics. Nor should they. Democracies need serious people in many places: government, law, technology, business, journalism, civil society, local communities, campaigns, universities, public service, and international institutions. But everyone who wants to lead a serious life has to answer a version of the same question: where will I exercise agency?
Let’s explore this with seriousness together. Nations and democracy, more broadly, will need people who can build institutions, renew parties, reform government, organise communities, use technology responsibly, defend truth, persuade across difference, and hold their nerve when the easy thing is to retreat into cynicism. There’s a difference between having opinions and making change; status and impact; expressing concern and taking responsibility; and being close to power and using power well. One of the temptations of modern life is to become a spectator with excellent analysis: to understand what is wrong, to describe it fluently, to criticise those who fail, but never quite decide where you are prepared to act.
The American 250th anniversary gives this final question a particular force. The democratic experiment has never been static. It’s always depended on people willing to renew it, defend it, expand it, and make it real in the conditions of their own time. That’s now the task facing another generation. What’ll be different because you were there?